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Family Violence and Football: 
The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior
* 
 
We study the link between family violence and the emotional cues associated with wins and 
losses by local professional football teams. We hypothesize that the risk of violence is 
affected by the ‘gain-loss’ utility of game outcomes around a rationally expected reference 
point. Our empirical analysis uses police reports of violent incidents on Sundays during the 
professional football season. Controlling for the pre-game point spread and the size of the 
local viewing audience, we find that upset losses (defeats when the home team was 
predicted to win by 4 or more points) lead to a 10 percent increase in the rate of at-home 
violence by men against their wives and girlfriends. In contrast, losses when the game was 
expected to be close have small and insignificant effects. Upset wins (when the home team 
was predicted to lose) also have little impact on violence, consistent with asymmetry in the 
gain-loss utility function. The rise in violence after an upset loss is concentrated in a narrow 
time window near the end of the game, and is larger for more important games. We find no 
evidence for reference point updating based on the halftime score. 
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suggestions. I. Introduction 
  Violence by men against members of their own family is one of the most common 
yet perplexing forms of criminal behavior.
1  One interpretation is that intra-family 
violence is instrumental behavior that is used by domineering men to control their 
partners and children (e.g., Dobash and Dobash, 1979).
2  An alternative view is that 
family violence is expressive behavior that either provides positive utility to some men 
(e.g., Tauchen et al., 1991; Aizer, 2010), or arises unintentionally when an argument 
escalates out of control (e.g., Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980; Johnson, 2009).  
  An expressive interpretation of family violence suggests a potentially important 
role for emotional cues (or “visceral factors”) in precipitating violence.
3  In this paper we 
study the effects of the emotional cues associated with wins and losses by local 
professional football teams, using police reports of family violence during the regular 
season of the National Football League (NFL).  Specifically, we hypothesize the risk of 
violence is affected by the ‘gain-loss’ utility associated with game outcomes around a 
rationally expected reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). 
  Our focus on professional football is motivated by three considerations.  First, 
NFL fans are strongly attached to their local teams.  Home games on Sunday afternoons 
typically attract 25% or more of the local television audience.
4  Second, the existence of a 
                                                 
1 There are 2.5 to 4.5 million physical assaults inflicted on adult women by their intimate partner per year 
(Rand and Rennison, 2005). About one-third of female homicide victims in the U.S. were killed by their 
husband or partner (Fox and Zawitz, 2007).  
2 Chwe (1990) shows that painful punishment can arise in an agency model when the agent has low outside 
opportunities, even if punishment is costly for the principal.  Bloch and Rao (2002) propose a model in 
which husbands use violence to signal the quality of their marriage to their wives’ families. 
3 See Loewenstein (2000) for a general discussion and Laibson (2001) and Bernheim and Rangel (2004) for 
models of the effect of external cues on decision-making.  
4 In 2008, NFL Sunday football games were the highest-rated local programs in 88% of the market-weeks.   
Nationally, the top 10 television programs for 18-49 year old men in 2008 were all NFL football games 
(NFL and Nielsen Media Research, cited in Ground Report, January 7, 2009).  
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 well-organized betting market allows us to infer the expected outcome of each game, and 
use this as a reference point for gain-loss utility.
5  Conditioning on the pre-game point 
spread also allows us to interpret any differential effect of a win versus a loss as a causal 
effect of the game outcome.  Third, the structure of NFL competition and the availability 
of detailed game statistics make it easy to identify more or less salient games, and to 
measure the updated probability of a win by the home team midway through the game. 
  Two other recent studies have explored the link between football and violence.  
Gantz, Wang, and Bradley (2006) relate police reports of family violence to the 
occurrence of NFL games involving the local team, and find that game-days are 
associated with higher rates of violence.  Rees and Schnepel (2009) document the effects 
of college football home games on rates of assault, vandalism, and alcohol-related 
offenses.
6   We go beyond these studies by examining the effects of wins and losses 
relative to pre-game expectations, by controlling for the size of the local viewing 
audience, by studying the inter-day timing of violent incidents, by comparing the effects 
of  more and less salient games, and by testing for potential updating of the reference 
point for game outcomes using the score at half-time. 
  Our analysis incorporates family violence data for over 750 city and county police 
agencies in the National Incident Based Reporting System, merged with information on 
Sunday NFL games played by 6 teams over a 12-year period.  Controlling for the pre-
game point spread and the size of the local television viewing audience, we find that 
“upset losses” by the home team (losses when the team was predicted to win by 4 points 
                                                 
5 As discussed in Levitt (2004) for example, football betting uses a point spread to clear the market.  See 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) on the information-aggregating properties of betting markets.    
6 Rees and Schnepel (2009) show that games that involve the upset of a team ranked in the top 25 by the 
Associated Press (AP) poll have much higher rates of violence.  Their definition of “upsets” is substantially 
different than ours, since a game can only be an upset if a nationally-ranked team is playing. 
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 or more) lead to a roughly 10% increase in the number of police reports of at-home male-
on-female intimate partner violence.  Consistent with reference point behavior, losses 
when the game was expected to be close have no significant effect on family violence.  
Upset wins (i.e., victories when the home team was expected to lose) also have no 
significant impact on the rate of violence, suggesting an important asymmetry in the 
reaction to unanticipated losses and gains.   
  The increases in violence after an upset loss are concentrated in a narrow time 
window around the end of the game, as might be expected if the violence is due to 
transitory emotional shocks.  We also find that upset losses in more salient games (those 
involving a traditional rival, or when the team is still in playoff contention) have a bigger 
effect on the rate of violence.  Finally, we test whether the reference point for emotional 
cues is revised during the first half of the game, but find no evidence of updating.  
  Taken together our findings suggest that emotional cues based on the outcomes of 
professional football games exert a relatively strong effect on the occurrence of family 
violence.  The estimated impact of an upset loss, for example, is about one-third as large 
as the jump in violence on a major holiday like the Fourth of July.  More broadly, our 
research contributes to a growing body of work on the importance of reference point 
behavior, and provides field-based empirical support for Koszegi and Rabin’s (2006) 
prediction that individuals frame gains and losses around a rationally-expected reference 
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 II. Modeling the Effect of Emotional Cues and Family Violence 
  This section presents a simplified model of the impact of NFL game outcomes on 
the occurrence of family violence, and describes our empirical framework for measuring 
the effects of these cues.  Our key hypothesis is that wins and losses generate emotional 
cues that reflect ‘gain-loss’ utility around a rational reference point.   We consider two 
alternative mechanisms through which cues affect violence.  The first builds on the 
family conflict paradigm in sociology (Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980) and research 
on loss of control (e.g., Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996; Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2007) and treats violence as an unintended outcome of 
interactions in conflict-prone families.  We assume that men are more likely to lose 
control when they have been exposed to a negative emotional shock.  The second is a 
family bargaining model in which women endure violence in exchange for inter-family 
transfers, and men’s demand for violence rises after a negative cue. 
 
a. Loss-of-Control Model 
  Consider a couple that each period has some risk of a conflictual interaction (i.e., 
a heated disagreement or argument).  With some probability h ≥ 0 the interaction 
escalates to violence (i.e., the husband “loses control”).
7  The likelihood of losing control 
is influenced by the emotional cues associated with the outcome y of a professional 
football game, where y=1 indicates a home-team victory and y=0 indicates a loss.  
Letting p=E[y] we assume that: 
(1)  h  =   h
0  − μ ( y−p )  , 
                                                 
7 Strictly speaking our model focuses on the risk of violent interactions between partners: the outcome 
could involve injuries to both partners.  In our data about 80% of the victims of intimate partner violence 
are women, so we assume a male perpetrator. 
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 where μ is the gain-loss utility associated with the game outcome (Koszegi and Rabin, 
2006).  For simplicity we assume that μ is piece-wise linear, with 
  μ( y−p)  =   α ( y−p ) ,   y−p < 0     
      =      β ( y−p ) ,   y−p > 0  , 
for positive constants α and β.  Loss aversion implies that α > β, i.e., that the marginal 
effect of a positive cue is smaller than the marginal effect of a negative cue. 
 Recognizing  that  y is binary, the implied probabilities of a loss of control are 
(2)  h
L(p)  =   h
0   +   αp            if  y=0  (a loss)   
  h
W(p)  =   h
0   − β (1−p)     if  y=1  (a win). 
The upper line in Figure 1 represents h
L(p).  When p=0 a home-team loss is fully 
anticipated and there is no emotional cue, so h
L = h
0.   When p>0 a loss is “bad news”, 
with a stronger negative cue the higher is p: thus h
L is increasing in p.  The lower line in 
the figure represents h
W(p).  A win when p=0 is the “best possible” news, leading to the 
lowest probability of loss of control, h
0−β.  For higher values of p a win is less of 
positive shock, so h
W is also increasing in p. 
  Assuming that the probability of a conflictual interaction is q≥0, the probability of 
a violent incident, conditional on watching the game, is qh.  If the husband always 
watches, the probability of violence is therefore (h
0+αp)q  in the event of a loss and 
(h
0−β(1−p))q in the event of a win.  The differential effect of a loss versus a win on the 
probability of violence is: 
(3)   Δ(risk | p)  =   [ β + (α−β) p] q  , 
which is positive and increasing in p, assuming that α > β.   
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   In Card and Dahl (2009) we present a forward-looking model in which husbands 
decide in advance whether to watch a game or not, taking into account the pleasure of 
watching a win versus a loss, and the risk of exposure to the emotional cue if they watch.  
In this case the differential effect of a loss versus a win on the probability of violence can 
be written as:  
(4)  Δ(risk | p) =  [ β + (α−β) p]  ×  E[q | watch, p ]  ×  Prob[ watch | p] . 
A comparison of (4) to (3) shows that discretionary viewing behavior will reinforce the 
effect of an increase in p on the differential effect of a loss versus a win if more people 
watch a game when p is higher, and/or if the composition of the viewing audience shifts 
toward more conflict-prone men when p is higher.   
 
b. An Alternative Model 
  A simple loss-of-control model is broadly consistent with the literature on 
situational family violence (e.g., Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980; Gelles and Straus, 
1988; Johnson, 1995), and with recent economic models of addiction (Bernheim and 
Rangel, 2004) and failure of self control (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2007).  In terms 
of predictions linking emotional cues to violence, however, it is indistinguishable from a 
family bargaining model in which men value the expression of violence and their 
preferences are affected by emotional cues from a gain-loss function like μ(y−p) in 
equation (1).
8  A potentially important distinction between these models is in the victim’s 
                                                 
8 Tauchen et al. (1991), Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997), Bowlus and Seitz (2006), and Aizer (2010) all 
assume that men value violence and their partners tolerate it in return for higher transfers.  An efficient 
bargain with unrestricted transfers maximizes E[ U(y-cw, v, h) ]  subject to  E[ V(cw, v) ] ≥ V
0, where 
y=family income, cw=consumption of wife, v=violence, h=cue, U is the male’s utility and V is the female’s.  
The optimal choices for v and cw equate the husband’s marginal willingness to pay for violence with his 
partner’s marginal supply price.  Assuming that negative cues increase the willingness to pay for violence, 
the level of violence demanded by the husband (and supplied by the wife) will respond as in equation (3).  
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 reaction to violence.  In a bargaining model the victim is compensated for her injuries, 
and the optimal choice of violence equates the husband’s willingness to pay for violence 
with his partner’s marginal cost.  Given that, victims have no incentive to call the police 
or take other protective action (and in fact outside intervention is inefficient).  Protective 
behavior is more easily interpreted in a loss-of-control model in which neither party 
benefits from violence.  Nevertheless, both models imply a similar link between 
emotional cues and the probability of family violence. 
 
c. Evaluating the Effect of Emotional Cues 
  We test for the predicted effects of positive and negative emotional cues using a 
Poisson count model for the number of police-reported episodes of family violence in 
cities and counties in states with a “home” NFL team.  As discussed below we classify 
games based on the Las Vegas point spread into three categories: home team likely to 
win, opposing team likely to win, or game expected to be close.  We then fit models that 
include a full set of interactions between the ex-ante classification and whether the game 
was a won or lost by the home team (3×2=6 categories), treating non-game days (i.e., 
Sundays when the home team has a bye week or is playing on another day of the week) 
as the base case.  As a robustness check, we also fit a model with a polynomial in the 
point spread, interacted with the game outcome. 
  Our key identifying assumption is that the outcome of an NFL game is random, 
conditional on the Las Vegas spread.  Conditioning on the pre-game spread we can 
therefore interpret any difference between the rate of family violence following a win or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Our reading of the extensive family violence literature outside of economics is that no one thinks a 
marginal condition like this is true – in other words, the cost of violence to the partner in the “high cue” 
condition is often far beyond the “price” that is paid by the perpetrator. 
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 loss as a causal effect of the outcome of the game.  We test for reference point behavior 
by testing whether the impact of a loss is greater when the home team was expected to 
win than when the game was expected to be close, or the team was expected to lose.  We 
also test for asymmetric reactions to good and bad news by comparing the magnitude of 
the effects of upset losses and upset wins. 
 
 III. Data Sources and Sample Construction 
a. Measuring Family Violence: NIBRS Data on Police-Reported Violence 
  Our empirical analysis is based on police reports of family violence in the 
National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).  NIBRS includes reports of crime to 
individual police agencies: the reports are not necessarily associated with an arrest.
9  
Each report includes information on the characteristics of the victim (age, gender, etc.), 
the offender (gender, relationship to the victim), and the incident (date, time of day, 
location, injuries). 
  NIBRS has two main advantages for our study.  First, it includes all the family 
violence incidents recorded by a given agency. Since family violence is relatively rare, a 
complete count is needed to measure responses to NFL game outcomes on specific days 
in specific locations.  Second, NIBRS includes real-time information on the date and time 
of day of the incident.  Other sources of information on family violence (such as the 
National Crime Victimization Survey) are based on recall over a multiple-month period 
and cannot be used to measure occurrences by exact day and time. 
                                                 
9 About half of family assaults in the NIBRS result in an arrest (Durose et al., 2005; Hirschel, 2008).  
Direct arrests by police officers with no intervening report of a crime are also included in NIBRS.  
Information on the NIBRS data set is available at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/NIBRS/.   
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   One limitation of NIBRS is that it only includes police-reported family 
violence.
10  A comparison of the implied rate of violence experienced by women age 18-
54 in NIBRS to the rate in the 1995 National Violence Against Women Survey 
(NVAWS) suggests that NIBRS captures a relatively high fraction of serious violence 
(i.e., episodes that would be classified as assault or intimidation).  Specifically, we 
estimate that the annual risk of IPV is approximately 1.6% per year in the 2000 NIBRS, 
versus 1.3% per year in the NVAWS (1995-96).
11  A second limitation is that 
participation by police agencies in NIBRS is voluntary, and is relatively low.  The total 
fraction of the U.S. population covered by NIBRS was only 4% in 1995, but had risen to 
25% by 2006. 
  As has been noted in other studies (e.g., Vazquez, Stohr and Purkiss, 2005; Gantz, 
Wang, and Bradley, 2006) the rate of family violence varies substantially across the days 
of the week, with much higher rates on weekends than weekdays.  In view of these 
patterns, and the small number of NFL games on days other than Sunday, we have 
elected to simplify our analysis by limiting our sample to the 17 Sundays during the 
regular NFL season.  We define intimate partner violence (IPV) as an incident of simple 
assault, aggravated assault, or intimidation by a spouse, partner, or boyfriend/girlfriend.   
Our primary focus is on male-on-female IPV occurring at home between noon and 
midnight Eastern Time.   
  Table 1 provides summary statistics for IPV for our estimation sample (Sundays 
during the regular football season) for the set of NIBRS agencies used in our analysis (all 
                                                 
10 Only about one-half of adult women in the National Crime Victimization Survey who were assaulted by 
their spouse or partner reported the incident to police (Durose et al., 2005).   
11 To construct a national incidence rate from the NIBRS we assume that information on the family 
relationship of the perpetrator is missing at random, and inflated the incident rates for the agencies in 
NIBRS to the national level using relative populations as of 2000. 
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 reporting police agencies in the set of states that we match to NFL teams, as described in 
the next section).
12  In our estimation sample, the overall rate of IPV is 1.28 per 100,000 
individuals per day.
13   Panel A shows how the rate of intimate partner violence varies by 
location and victim-offender relationship.  Most of the victims of IPV are women (81%), 
and most are victimized at home (82%), leading to our focus on at-home male-on-female 
incidents.
14  Within this class, violence by husbands against their wives and violence by 
men against unmarried partners account for roughly equal shares. 
  Panel B narrows the focus to male-on-female violence occurring at home.  To 
crudely characterize the severity of an incident, we classified aggravated assaults and 
other incidents involving physical injury as “serious assaults,” and the remaining forms 
of IPV as “minor assaults”.
15  Using this classification just over one-half of male-on-
female at-home IPV incidents are serious assaults. 
  Alcohol use is widely believed to contribute to family violence (Klostermann and 
Fals-Steward, 2006) and may amplify the effects of emotional cues (Exum, 2002). 
Unfortunately, alcohol use information in NIBRS is limited to a single variable indicating 
                                                 
12 We include incidents reported by city and county agencies but exclude state police, college police, and 
special agencies.  We limit the sample to agencies which report data on any crime (not just IPV) for at least 
13 out of 17 Sundays in a season.  Copies of the programs that we used to process the publicly available 
NIBRS data are available in the online appendix. 
13 We refer to the hours between noon and midnight ET as a day; these hours account for roughly 60% of 
at-home male-on-female IPV.  Ideally the rate of intimate partner violence would be expressed relative to 
the number of intimate partner couples.  In 2000 there were approximately 21 intimate partnerships per 100 
people in the U.S. population: thus the rate per couple is approximately 4.8 times the rate per person.  Our 
models include agency fixed effects and therefore control flexibly for most of the variation in the size of 
the at-risk population. 
14 The relative fraction of female victims of intimate partner violence is controversial because some data 
sources (in particular, behavioral checklists that collect incidents of  slapping and pushing as well as more 
serious violence) find that men and women are equally likely to be victimized (e.g., Straus, Gelles, and 
Steinmetz, 1980).  Police reports and victimization surveys suggest that women are more likely to be the 
victims of relatively serious violence (see Hamby, 2005, Table I).  
15 NIBRS uses the FBI’s definition of aggravated assault, which is an unlawful attack where the offender 
wields a weapon or the victim suffers obvious severe or aggravated injury.  Simple assault is also an 
unlawful attack, but does not involve a weapon or obvious severe or aggravated bodily injury.  Intimidation 
is the act of placing a person in reasonable fear of bodily harm without a weapon or physical attack. 
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 whether the offender was suspected of using alcohol (or drugs) during or shortly before 
the offense.  Overall, about 20% of at-home male-on-female incidents of IPV list alcohol 
or drugs as a contributing factor. 
 
b. Matching NFL Team Data to NIBRS Violence Data 
  We link the NIBRS data to the team records for “local” NFL franchises.  Since 
NIBRS data are unavailable for many larger cities, relatively few NFL teams can be 
matched to crime rates in the city (or county) that hosts their home stadium.  As an 
alternative, we focus on cities and counties in states where there is a single NFL team (or 
nearby team), assigning all jurisdictions within a state to that team.  Using this approach, 
and requiring that at least 4 years of crime data are available for a given team, we were 
able to match six NFL teams to 763 NIBRS agencies. 
  Table 2 shows the six football teams in our sample, with the associated NIBRS 
states listed in parentheses.
16   For each team we also show the win-loss record in the 
sample years for which NIBRS data are available, and the number of reporting agencies 
in the state in that year.  Three teams (the Carolina Panthers, Detroit Lions, and New 
England Patriots) have NIBRS data available for all 12 years, starting in 1995 and 
continuing to 2006.  The three remaining teams (the Denver Broncos, Kansas City 
Chiefs, and Tennessee Titans) enter the NIBRS sample in later years.  Within a state the 
number of reporting agencies in NIBRS tends to rise over time, though there are some 
downward fluctuations as certain agencies leave the program. 
  The win-loss records reported in Table 2 display wide variation across teams.  
                                                 
16 Kansas City is in Missouri, but we assume fans in Kansas also follow the team.  NIBRS has no data for 
Missouri agencies until 2006, the last year of our sample period. 
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 Detroit had a weak record over most of the sample period, while Denver and New 
England were relatively successful.  Even for a given team, however, there are swings 
from year to year.  Denver, for example, had a 14-2 win-loss record in the 1998 season 
(and won the Superbowl), but had a losing season in 1999.  Since predicted game 
outcomes tend to be based on recent past performance, these patterns hint at the 
prevalence of both upset losses (e.g., during the Denver Bronco’s 1999 season) and upset 
wins (e.g., during the Kansas City Chief’s 2003 season).  We characterize upset losses 
and upset wins more formally using the Las Vegas point spread in the next subsection. 
  In all, the 6 teams in our sample can be matched to 993 regular season football 
games and 53 playoff games.  The characteristics of these games are shown in the upper 
panel of Table 3.  The vast majority (87%) of the regular season games were played on 
Sundays.  As noted earlier, given the seasonal and intra-week variation in family violence 
rates, we elected to simplify our empirical design by focusing on regular-season Sunday 
games.  The characteristics of these games and their associated local television market are 
summarized in panels B and C of Table 3.  
 
c. Expected Outcomes from Betting Markets 
  Betting on NFL game outcomes is organized through Las Vegas bookmakers, 
who equilibrate the market using a point spread.   If the point spread is -3 for one team 
against another, the team must win by more than 3 points for a bet on that team to pay 
off.  The market assessment of the outcome of a game is contained in the closing value of 
the point spread (the so-called “closing line”). 
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   Previous research has suggested that the point spread is an unbiased predictor of 
game outcomes in the NFL (e.g., Pankoff 1968; Gandar et al., 1988).  To verify this 
conclusion, we collected data on point spreads and final scores for all 3,725 NFL football 
games played during the 1995-2006 seasons.  Figure 2 shows the relationship between 
the actual and predicted point spread in each game.  The actual spread is “noisier” than 
the predicted spread, but the two are highly correlated.  In fact, a regression of the actual 
on the predicted spread yields a coefficient of 1.01 (standard error = 0.03).  Thus, there is 
no evidence against the null hypothesis of an efficient prediction.  Moreover, the 
R-squared of the relationship is relatively strong (0.20) suggesting that the closing line is 
an informative predictor of game outcomes. 
  The vertical lines in Figure 2 divide the predicted spreads into three regions, 
depending on whether the home team is predicted to win by at least 4 points, predicted to 
lose by at least 4 points, or predicted to have a close game.  About 45% of games are 
expected to be close: the remaining games are equally divided in the two tails.  In our 
empirical analysis we use these three categories to classify games as “predicted wins”, 
“predicted close games”, and “predicted losses” for the home team. 
  Our model is written in terms of the ex-ante probability of a home-team win, 
rather than the point spread.  The mapping between the two is shown in Figure 3.  To 
derive this relationship we regressed the probability of a victory by the home team on a 
third order polynomial in the spread.  The fitted relationship follows the expected 
“inverse S-curve” shape, and is symmetric.  For spreads of ±14 points (a range that 
includes 98% of games) the probability of a win is very close to linear, with each one-
point increase in the spread translating into a 3% decrease in the probability of a win.  For 
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 games with a spread of -4 points or less (“predicted wins”) the probability of a home 
team victory is 63% or greater.  For “predicted losses” (spread ≥ 4) the probability of a 
win is 37% or less. 
  Panel B of Table 3 summarizes the predicted outcomes of the 866 regular-season 
Sunday games in our IPV analysis sample.  Of these games, 283 (33%) were predicted 
wins for the home team, 206 (24%) were predicted losses, and 377 (44%) were predicted 
close games.  The greater number of predicted wins than losses in our sample reflects the 
inclusion of two relatively successful teams (Denver and New England).  We also report 
the actual outcomes of the games: the home team lost relatively few (28%) of the games 
they were favored to win by 4 or more points, and won relatively few (32%) of the games 
they were predicted to lose by 4 or more points.  Among predicted close games the home 
team victory rate was approximately 50%. 
  As discussed in Section Vd, below, we present some analyses of game outcomes 
relative to the point spread at halftime (which we call the “halftime spread”).  Like the 
final score, the halftime spread is more variable than the pre-game spread:  by the 
midpoint of the game only 28% of games are closer than 4 points, while 44% are within 
the same range using the pre-game spread.  The halftime spread is also a better predictor 
of the final game outcome.  For example, among games where the home team led by 4 
points or more at halftime, the fraction of losses was 18% (versus 28% using the same 
classification of the pre-game spread).    
  Panel B also shows two other important characteristics of NFL games that we 
explore in later analyses: the starting time, and the likely emotional salience of a game.  
The largest share of games (68%) in our sample had a 1:00 PM starting time.  Most of the 
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 others (26%) had a 4:00 PM start time, while only 6% were night games.  We consider 
three measures of emotional salience: whether the home team was still in playoff 
contention; whether the game was played against a traditional “rival” team; and whether 
the game involved an unusually high number of sacks, turnovers, or penalty yards.
17  
Most regular season games (68%) are played when the team is still in playoff contention, 
while about one-fifth are played against a traditional rival, and about 40% involve a high 
number of sacks, turnovers, or penalty yards.  We define “highly salient” games as those 
in which the home team was still in playoff contention and either played against a 
traditional rival or had an unusual number of sacks, turnovers, or penalty yards.  These 
games represent 37% of our sample. 
 
d. Measures of Viewership 
  We purchased data from Nielsen Media Research (“Nielsen”) for the six 
television markets corresponding to the teams in our matched NIBRS-NFL sample.  
Nielsen uses information from metering devices installed in a sample of homes to 
estimate the fraction of all “television households” that are watching a given program at a 
given time. Panel C of Table 3 shows the Nielsen ratings for the regular season Sunday 
football games in our estimation sample (each Nielsen point represents 1 percent of local 
television households).  On average, 24% of all households watch their local team play 
on a typical Sunday.  In contrast, the Sunday afternoon television audience when the local 
team is not playing is only one-fourth as large.  
                                                 
17 We classify a team as out of contention once the predicted probability of making the playoffs (based on 
the historical record for teams with a similar win-loss record at the same point in the season) is under 10%.  
We identified traditional rivalries using information from “Rivalries in the National Football League” on 
Wikipedia.  A list of the rival team pairs we use is available on request. 
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   Figure 4 plots the fraction of households watching a game (deviated from the 
average viewership in the same media market on Sunday game-days) against the pre-
game spread.   The estimated regression line in the graph shows that the expected 
audience falls by about 1 percentage point as the spread rises from -4 (a predicted win by 
the home team) to +4 (a predicted loss).  This is not a large effect, and we infer that any 
differential reaction to the outcomes of predicted wins versus predicted losses is unlikely 
to be attributable to changes in viewership. 
 
IV. Econometric Model and Main Estimation Results 
a. Econometric Model 
  Given the incident-based nature of NIBRS data, we specify a Poisson regression 
model for the number of incidents of intimate partner violence reported by a given police 
agency on a given Sunday of the regular NFL season.  Specifically we assume that 
(5)   log(μjt)  =    θj  +  Xjtγ  +  f(pjt, yjt; λ) , 
where μjt represents the expected number of incidents of IPV reported by agency j in time 
period t,  θj  represents a fixed effect for the agency (which controls for the size and 
overall characteristics of the population served by the agency), Xjt represents a set of 
time-varying controls (e.g., controls for season and weather), and f(pjt, yjt; λ) is a general 
function of pjt, the probability of a victory by the home team for a game played on date t, 
and yjt, the actual game outcome, with parameters λ. We assume that pjt  = p(Sjt) where Sjt 
is the observed pre-game point spread, allowing us to write 
(5′)   log(μjt)  =    θj  +  Xjtγ  +  g(Sjt, yjt; λ) . 
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 Our primary interest is in the effect of a loss or win by the home team, controlling for the 
spread.   Assuming that the Las Vegas betting market provides efficient forecasts of NFL 
game outcomes, the actual outcome of a game is “as good as random” when we control 
for the spread, and a specification like (5′) yields unbiased estimates of the causal effect 
of a loss relative to a win.
18
  An advantage of a Poisson specification is that fixed effects can be included 
without creating an incidental parameters problem (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).  
This is potentially important in the NIBRS context because there are many small police 
agencies with relatively low counts of family violence incidents.  A second useful 
property of a Poisson specification is that consistency of the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the parameters associated with the time-varying covariates (and in particular, 
the parameters λ) only requires that we have correctly specified the conditional mean for 
log(μjt) (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986).  Consistency does not require that the arrival 
process for IPV incidents is actually Poisson. 
 
b. Baseline Empirical Results 
  Table 4 presents results for our baseline Poisson regressions for at-home male-on-
female intimate partner violence occurring between the hours of 12 pm and 12 am on 
Sundays of the NFL regular season.  In these models we assume that  
     g(Sjt, yjt , λ)   =   λ1·1(Sjt ≤ −4)       +    λ2·1(Sjt ≤ −4) 1(yjt = 0)  
   +       λ3·1(−4< Sjt <4)  +    λ4·1(−4< Sjt <4) 1(yjt = 0) 
   +       λ5·1( Sjt  ≥4)        +    λ6·1( Sjt ≥4) 1(yjt = 1) , 
                                                 
18 Formally, for a binary random variable y with mean p, E[ y | p, Z] = E[ y | p]  for any Z, so conditioning 
on p,  y is independent of Z.  Assuming the mapping p(S) from the spread to p is invertible and does not 
depend on Z, E[ y | S, Z] = E[ y | p, Z] = E[ y | p], so y is independent of Z conditioning on S.  
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 i.e., we include dummies for three ranges of the spread, and interactions of these 
dummies with a game outcome indicator.  The main coefficients of interest are λ2, λ4, and 
λ6, which measure the effects of an upset loss, a close loss, and an upset win, 
respectively.  The coefficients associated with the range of the spread (λ1, λ3, λ5) are also 
potentially interesting, but less easily interpreted, since variation in S may be correlated 
with other factors that affect the likelihood of IPV. 
  The basic model in column (1) of Table 4 includes the spread indicators and the 
interactions with the win or loss variables, as well as a set of agency fixed effects.  
Columns 2-5 add in three sets of time-varying covariates: season, week of season, and 
holiday dummies; local weather conditions on the day of the game; and the Nielsen 
Rating for the local NFL game broadcast.  The Nielsen data are only available for the 
90% of the game days in our sample that occur in 1997 or later.  To check the sensitivity 
of our results to the sample, column 4 presents a specification identical to the one in 
column 3 (with agency fixed effects and date and weather controls) but fit to the 
subsample with Nielsen data.   
  Focusing on the coefficients associated with the game outcome (in the first three 
rows of the table) notice that the estimates are quite stable across specifications, as would 
be anticipated if the game outcome is orthogonal to the other covariates, conditional on 
the spread.
19  The estimates show that an upset loss leads to an approximately 10% 
increase in the rate of male-on-female at-home IPV.  In contrast, the estimated effects of 
a loss when the game was predicted to be close are only about one-fourth to one-third as 
large in magnitude, and are never significant.  The difference provides direct support for 
                                                 
19 Estimates of the complete set of coefficients for the baseline model in column 3 of Table 4 are presented 
in Appendix Table 5 of the online appendix.  
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 reference-point behavior of fans.  Even more surprising, perhaps, is that upset wins 
appear to have little or no protective effect.  Indeed, the estimated effects of an upset win 
are all positive, rather than negative as would be expected if the reaction to wins and 
losses is symmetric.  Formal tests for symmetry (comparing the effect of an upset loss to 
the negative of the effect for an upset win) are shown in the third-last row of the table and 
indicate substantial evidence of loss aversion.
20
  In column 5 we explore the effect of controlling for the number of households 
tuned in to watch a local game.  The Nielsen audience ratings are a significant factor in 
game day violence (t=2.2), with intimate partner violence rising by about 0.3% for each 
percentage point increase in the number of households watching the game.  Importantly, 
however, the addition of this proxy for the number of couples at home together during a 
game has no effect on the estimated effects of the game outcomes.  This suggests that the 
asymmetric reaction to upset losses and upset wins cannot be attributed to the lower 
number of viewers for expected losses. 
  
V. Extensions and Robustness Checks 
a. Intra-day Timing of Violence Reports 
  Our baseline specifications examine the effect of NFL game outcomes on 
incidents of IPV in the twelve hour period starting at noon.  Using NIBRS information on 
the timing of incident reports (which is coded to the hour of the day) we can refine these 
models and check whether the pattern is consistent with a causal effect of the game 
                                                 
20 As a robustness check, we explored whether violence is not due to upset losses per se but to game 
outcomes where the home team failed to “beat the spread.”  Specifically, we added a dummy equal to 1 if 
the actual point spread was less than the Las Vegas spread.  In a model like the one in Table 4, column 3, 
the estimated effect is relatively small and insignificantly different from zero (estimate = -.013, s.e. = .020). 
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 outcome.  Specifically, we fit separate models for incidents in various 3 hour time 
windows, allowing separate coefficients for games starting at 1 PM (68% of Sunday 
games) and 4 PM (26% of Sunday games).
21  The models – presented in Table 5 – 
include the Nielsen rating for the number of households watching a game, although the 
key coefficients are very similar when this variable is excluded. 
  Each column of Table 5 shows the effects of game outcomes on violence in a 
different time window.  For the 12 PM to 3 PM window (column 1) there is no significant 
effect of any game outcomes.  Since the final outcomes of the 1 PM and 4 PM games are 
still unknown at 3 PM, this is consistent with the assumption that it is the game outcome 
that matters.  By comparison, for the 3 PM – 6 PM window (column 2) there is a 
significant upset loss effect for 1 PM games, but no significant effect for the 4 PM games.  
The 1 PM games end in this interval, while the 4 PM games are still going on, so again 
the pattern is consistent with a causal effect of the game outcome.  Between 6 and 9 PM 
(column 3) there is no significant effect of an upset loss for the 1 PM games, but a 
sizeable effect (a significant 31% increase in violence) for the 4 PM games.  Finally, 
during the 9 PM to midnight interval (column 4), neither of the two upset loss 
coefficients is statistically significant.  In sum, while the standard errors are fairly large, 
especially for the less-numerous 4 PM games (which include only 16 upset losses and 13 
upset wins), the data suggest that the spike in violence after an upset loss is concentrated 
in a narrow time window surrounding the end of the game. 
                                                 
21 We do not try to fit separate coefficients for games starting at 8 PM, since there are very few of these 
games (6% of the sample), and until 2006 they were only shown on cable or satellite. 
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 b. Emotionally Salient Games 
  Assuming that the link between NFL game outcomes and violence arises through 
emotional cues, one might expect more “emotionally salient” games to have larger 
effects.  The models in Table 6 explore the relative effects of game outcomes for more 
salient games (upper panel) and less salient games (lower panel) using the salience 
classifications introduced in Table 3.
22  In column 1, we define salience by whether the 
home team is still in playoff contention (based on having at least a 10% chance of making 
the playoffs).  Among such games the effect of an upset loss rises to 13%, while the 
effect of a close loss rises to 5% and is marginally significant (t=1.8).  In contrast, when 
the home team is no longer in playoff contention the effect of an upset loss is small and 
statistically insignificant.  The effects of upset losses in the two types of games are 
statistically different from each other at the 11% level (third-last row of the table). 
  Column 2 looks at games against a traditional rival team.  The effect of an upset 
loss is about twice as large for a rivalry game compared to a non-rivalry game (20% 
versus 8%, p-value for test of equality = 0.01).  There is also a marginally significant 
increase in violence following an upset win against a rival (t=2.0), a pattern that is 
inconsistent with our simple emotional cueing model.  
  Upset losses in games that are particularly frustrating for fans could also generate 
a larger emotional response.  In column 3 we look at the effects of three potentially 
frustrating occurrences: 4 or more sacks, 4 or more turnovers, or 80 or more penalty 
yards.  At least one of these events happens in about 40% of the games in our sample.  
For frustrating games defined in this manner, the estimated effect of an upset loss is 15%, 
                                                 
22 We fit the models in each column with a full set of interactions between the salience indicator and the 6 
dummies representing the pre-game spread and its interaction with the game outcome. 
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 compared with an estimated 7% increase in violence for upset losses in non-frustrating 
games. 
  In the final column of Table 6, we narrow the focus to the 37% of games where 
the home team is still in playoff contention and is either playing a traditional rival or the 
game involved an unusual number of sacks, turnovers, or penalties.  The effect of an 
upset loss is now a 17% increase in IPV, compared to a 13% increase for all playoff-
contention games in column 1.  Moreover, the effect of an upset loss is very close to zero 
for games which do not fit these criteria.  (In fact none of the spread or outcome 
interaction coefficients are large or significant for these games).  These patterns suggest 
that the overall rise in IPV following an upset loss is driven entirely by losses in games 
that “matter” the most to fans.
23
 
c. Alternative Parameterization 
  The models in Tables 4-6 all control for the pre-game point spread using a simple 
set of indicators for 3 ranges of the spread.  As an alternative, we fit a set of models with 
a second order polynomial in the point spread, and an interaction between the polynomial 
and a dummy for a home team loss.  Consistent with our baseline specifications, the 
results show that the effect of a home team loss on intimate partner violence is large and 
positive when the home team is expected to win, and declines steady as the expected 
likelihood of a home team victory increases.  This pattern is also present when we limit 
attention to “highly salient” games, defined as in column 4 of Table 6.  Figure 5 shows 
the estimated interaction effects for highly salient games, along with the associated 
                                                 
23 It is also possible that conditional on the point spread, more violent men are more likely to watch pivotal 
games (although the amount of selection would have to be sizeable).  
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 (point-wise) 95% confidence intervals.  For highly salient games with pre-game point 
spreads less than -2 or so, the effect of a loss is positive and significantly different from 
zero.  For predicted close games and predicted losses, the effects of a loss are 
insignificantly different from zero. 
  
d. Updating of the Reference Point for Game Outcomes 
  So far we have assumed that family violence is related to the gap between actual 
game outcomes and fans’ pre-game expectations.  Over the roughly 3 hours that a game 
actually occurs, however, fans receive new information about the likelihood of final 
victory, and it is interesting to ask whether the reference point for the emotional cue of 
the final outcome adjusts accordingly.  Some stickiness would seem to be required to 
generate the pattern of effects in Table 5, which shows little or no reaction while a game 
is in progress, but a rise in violence following an upset loss.  Since many of these losses 
would be predictable midway through the game, if fans actually updated their reference 
point the final score would not be a surprise.  To address the question more formally, we 
use information on the score at halftime to form an updated spread, and ask whether the 
rise in violence following a loss is better explained by pre-game expectations, or those as 
of halftime.   
 To  proceed,  let  p0 denote the probability of a home team victory based on the pre-
game spread, and let p1 denote the point spread at half-time.  Assume that the emotional 
cue generated by the game outcome (y) is based on the deviation from an updated 
reference point: 
   p
*  =     δ p1 +  (1 − δ) p0  . 
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 With fully rational updating δ would be equal to the coefficient of the halftime spread in 
a regression of the probability of ultimate victory on the pre-game and halftime spreads 
(which is approximately 0.6), while with rigid expectations δ=0.
24  Substituting this 
expression into equation (3), the predicted difference in the risk of violence after a loss 
versus a win becomes 
(3′)   Δ(risk | p)  =   [  β + (α−β) δ p1  + (α−β) (1 − δ) p0  ] q  . 
Consideration of this expression suggests that we extend our basic model by including a 
second set of indicators for upset loss, upset win, etc., based on the halftime spread.   
  Estimation results from two alterative variants of this extended specification are 
presented in Table 7.  Because of perfect co-linearity, we cannot simply replicate our 
baseline models by adding dummies for the 3 ranges of the halftime spread, and a full set 
of interactions with a loss or win dummy.
25  One estimable specification, which drops the 
main effects for the range of the half-time spread, is presented in the first column of the 
table.  In this specification the estimated interactions with the predicted outcomes based 
on the pre-game spread are all very similar to the estimates from our baseline model, 
whereas the interactions with the predicted outcomes based on the halftime spread are all 
small and insignificant (individually and jointly).  Results from an alternative, and more 
parsimonious specification are presented in columns 2 and 3.  Here, we include a linear 
control for the spread and a dummy for non-game days, rather than dummies for the 
                                                 
24 Appendix Table 1 presents a series of  models that relate the probability of a home team win to the pre-
game spread and the halftime spread.  Both are highly significant predictors: the relative magnitude of the 
halftime spread compared to the pre-game spread is approximately 0.6.  We also fit models that divide the 
pre-game and halftime spread into 3 ranges (with cutoffs at -4 and 4 points).  In these models the relative 
magnitudes of the halftime dummies are also about 60 percent of the combined magnitude. 
25 Our baseline model includes dummies for three ranges of the pre-game spread (S1,S2,S3), and interactions 
of these with a loss dummy (L), treating non-game days as the base case.  Call the additional indicators for 
the halftime spread (H1,H2,H3).  Since S1+S2+S3=H1+H2+H3=1, the set of 12 variables (S1,S2,S3), 
(H1,H2,H3),  (S1×L, S2×L, S3×L), (H1×L,H2×L,H3×L) has only 9 degrees of freedom. 
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 range of the spread.  As a check on the validity of this simpler specification, the model in 
column 2 excludes all the halftime variables.  As in our baseline models, this simple 
specification shows a roughly 10% effect of upset losses, and small and insignificant 
effects of upset wins and close loses.  Column 3 extends this model by adding dummies 
for upset win, upset loss, and close loss, based on predictions using the halftime spread.  
As in column 1, the halftime variables are jointly insignificant (p=0.50) though the point 
estimates are somewhat larger in magnitude.  Based on the results from these two 
specifications, we conclude that fans’ emotional reactions to game outcomes appear to be 
driven by the game outcome relative to expectations at the start of the game, with little or 
no updating using information as of halftime. 
 
e. Other Forms of Family Violence, Alcohol and Drug Use, Severity of Violence 
  As noted in Table 1, the most common family violence incidents are those 
committed at home by men against their wives and girlfriends.  While our main results 
concern these types of incidents, we also examined the effects of NFL game outcomes on 
family violence committed in different places, and involving different combinations of 
victims and offenders.  The results are summarized in Appendix Table 2 (available in the 
online appendix).  We find that upset losses have no significant effect on away-from-
home violence.  As a result, the effect on total male-on-female violence (combining at-
home and away-from-home) is somewhat smaller than the effect on at-home violence 
(around 7%).  We also find that NFL game outcomes have no large or significant effect 
on the rate of intimate partner violence committed by women.  On the other hand, 
violence by men against wives and girlfriends both respond about equally to upset losses.  
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 Rates of violence against family members other than an intimate partner (e.g., a child, 
sibling, or parent) also show no significant relationship with the outcomes of local NFL 
games, while there is some indication of an effect on rates of violence at home against 
friends.   
   To gain some insights into the kinds of incidents that are most affected by the 
emotional cues of NFL game outcomes, we fit separate Poisson models for incidents with 
alcohol and/or drugs involved, and for serious versus minor assaults.
26  The results, 
summarized in Appendix Table 3 of the online appendix, suggest that all forms of IPV 
rise following an upset loss, with no significant difference in the rise in alcohol-related 
and non-alcohol-related offenses.  We also looked at incidents occurring in larger and 
smaller places (populations over and under 50,000 as of the year 2000) and incidents 
committed by younger and older offenders (less than age 30 versus 30 or older), and 
found insignificantly different effects of upset losses. 
 
f. Other Robustness Tests 
  Finally, we have conducted a number of additional specification checks to judge 
the robustness of our main results.  These are summarized in Appendix Table 4 of the 
online appendix.  The specification checks include the use of a Negative Binomial model 
instead of a Poisson, estimation of models with date fixed effects, and inclusion of 
separate linear time trends for each of the individual teams in our sample.  None of these 
changes has much impact on our main results.  We also investigated different ways of 
dealing with the presence of days with no reported crime in the NIBRS data.  
                                                 
26 Recall that in about 20% of incidents the reporting officer notes that alcohol or drugs were a contributing 
factor in the incident – these are the incidents with “alcohol involved”.  Serious assaults include aggravated 
assaults and all other incidents in which the victim was physically injured. 
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 Reassuringly, our main results are very similar, regardless of whether we treat these “no 
crime” days as missing or true zeros.   
 
VI. Discussion 
  Our empirical results show a roughly 10% effect of an upset loss by the local NFL 
team on the rate of male-on-female at-home intimate partner violence.  To provide some 
context for the magnitude of this effect we estimated a set of Poisson models for the rate 
of IPV on all days of the year for the 6 states of our estimation sample.  These models 
included agency fixed effects, an expanded set of holiday dummies, dummies for the day 
of the week, the month, and the sample year, and the same set of weather controls 
included in our main models.
27  The resulting estimates show large and precisely 
estimated effects of major holidays on the rate of IPV: for example, Christmas day +18%, 
Thanksgiving +20%, Memorial Day +30%, New Year’s Day +31%, New Year’s Eve 
+22%, and July 4
th +29%.  They also show a significant positive effect of hotter weather: 
relative to a day with a maximum temperature less than 80 degrees, IPV is 8% higher 
when the maximum temperature is over 80.  Thus, an upset loss is comparable to the 
effect of a hot day, or about one-third of the effect of a holiday like Memorial Day or the 
Fourth of July.  We view the magnitude of the cueing effect attributable to an upset loss 
as rather large, considering that only a fraction of the population are serious football fans, 
and that our sample largely excludes the cities in which the NFL teams are located. 
  Our findings add to the literature on the impact of media on violence and the well-
being of women.  Television has been shown to influence a variety of behaviors and 
                                                 
27 These models, like our main results in Table 4, were fit using data on male-on-female at-home incidents 
from noon to midnight only. 
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 attitudes, including fertility choices, women’s status, and the acceptability of intimate 
partner violence (La Ferrara et al., 2008; Jensen and Oster, 2009).  As emphasized by 
Dahl and DellaVigna (2009), media (in particular, violent movies) affects behavior not 
only via content, but also because it changes time spent in alternative activities.  In our 
case, NFL football games are likely to bring couples together, and the emotional cues 
associated with televised games place women at an elevated risk of abuse. 
  From a broader perspective, our analysis contributes to the growing literature on 
the importance of reference points in observed behavior (see DellaVigna, 2009 for a 
review; Crawford and Meng, 2009 for a recent empirical contribution; and Abeler et al. 
2009 for a recent laboratory experiment).  A key advantage of our setting is that the 
“rational” reference points for NFL game outcomes are readily observable, and vary 
widely across games.  Our finding that upset losses have a large effect on family 
violence, whereas losses in games that were expected to be close have small and 
insignificant effects, provides confirmation of rational reference point formation.  In 
comparison to the large and systematic effects of upset losses we also find very small 
effects from upset wins, suggesting that gains and losses have asymmetric behavioral 
effects. 
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 Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Intimate Partner Violence, NIBRS data, 1995-2006. 
 
    
 
 
Intimate Partner Violence 
Daily Rate for the hours of 
12 PM to 11:59 PM 
Per 100,000 Population 
Fraction in Category 
or Subcategory 
    
    
    
A.  Sundays During Regular Football Season 
    
Location and Victim-Offender Relationship    
   All Intimate Partner Violence  1.28  1.00 
      Male on Female  1.04  .81 
         Occurring at Home  .85  .82 
            Against Wife  .46  .54 
            Against Girlfriend  .39  .46 
         Occurring Away from Home  .19  .18 
      Female on Male  .24  .19 
         Occurring at Home  .19  .79 
         Occurring Away from Home  .05  .21 
    
B.  Sundays During Regular Football Season, Male on Female, Occurring at Home 
    
Time of Day (all times Eastern Time)    
   12 PM to 2:59 PM  .16  .19 
   3 PM to 5:59 PM  .18  .22 
   6 PM to 8:59 PM  .25  .29 
   9 PM to 11:59 PM  .25  .30 
    
Alcohol Use and Assault Severity     
   Alcohol Involved  .17  .20 
   Minor Assault  .41  .48 
   Serious Assault  .44  .52 
    
Agency Size    
   Smaller Cities or Counties (pop<50K)  .89  .47 
   Larger Cities or Counties (pop≥50K) .73  .53 
    
Age    
   Younger Offenders (age<30)  .32  .38 
   Older Offenders (age≥30) .52  .61 
    
Notes:  Data are reports of intimate partner violence to local police agencies in the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS) for the states and years listed in Table 2.  Intimate partner is defined as a spouse 
(including common law and ex-spouse) or a boyfriend/girlfriend.  Violence is defined as aggravated assault, simple 
assault, or intimidation.  Alcohol involved indicates the reporting officer noted that either alcohol or drugs were a 
contributing factor.  Minor assault is simple assault or intimidation without injury; serious assault is aggravated 
assault or any assault with a physical injury.  Category fractions for agency size are weighted by the average 
population in smaller versus larger cities and counties.  
 
 Table 2.  NFL Football Teams Matched to NIBRS Agencies. 
 
   Season 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
              
 
Carolina Panthers (SC)              
   Regular Season W-L Record  7-9  12-4* 7-9  4-12  8-8  7-9  1-15  7-9  11-5*  7-9  11-5* 8-8 
      #  of  Reporting  Agencies  22 64 75 73 76 82 65 76 80 74 80 84 
   Pop. Coverage (thousands)  795  2,174  2,614 2,740 2,559 2,588 2,436 2,847  3,051  2,861 2,726 2,776 
 
Denver Broncos (CO)              
   Regular Season W-L Record      12-4* 14-2* 6-10  11-5* 8-8  9-7  10-6*  10-6* 13-3* 9-7 
      #  of  Reporting  Agencies      28 29 25 27 25 28 33 30 38 41 
   Pop. Coverage (thousands)      1,626 1,733 1,502 1,642 1,435 1,699  1,776  1,935 2,757 3,052 
 
Detroit Lions (MI)              
   Regular Season W-L Record  10-6*  5-11  9-7*  5-11  8-8*  9-7  2-14  3-13  5-11  6-10  5-11  3-13 
      #  of  Reporting  Agencies  63  108 141 141 145 159 158 168 168 164 173 180 
   Pop. Coverage (thousands)  1,799  3,142  4,451 4,606 4,951 5,895 5,872 6,211  6,370  6,611 7,801 7,883 
 
Kansas City Chiefs (KS)              
   Regular Season W-L Record            7-9  6-10  8-8  13-3*  7-9  10-6  9-7* 
   # of Reporting Agencies            39  43  47  44  41  38  45 
   Pop. Coverage (thousands)            794  791  1,291  1,225  1,140 1,149 1,246 
  
New England Patriots (MA, NH, VT)            
   Regular Season W-L Record  6-10  11-5* 10-6* 9-7*  8-8  5-11  11-5* 9-7  14-2*  14-2* 10-6* 12-4* 
      #  of  Reporting  Agencies  32 32 37 55 58 70 81 94  105  112  127  124 
   Pop. Coverage (thousands)  768  986  1,068 1,387 1,491 1,960 2,162 2,643  2,954  3,416 3,861 3,846 
 
Tennessee Titans (TN)               
   Regular Season W-L Record        8-8  13-3* 13-3* 7-9  11-5*  12-4*  5-11  4-12  8-8 
   # of Reporting Agencies        45  112  134  131  140  135  137  147  149 
   Pop. Coverage (thousands)        922  2,748 4,882 4,835 5,039  5,017  5,133 5,288 5,313 
              
Notes:  A * next to a regular season record indicates that the team played in the postseason.  Reporting agencies can be either 
cities or counties within the state indicated in parentheses. 
 Table 3.  Summary Statistics for NFL Football Games and Nielsen Television Ratings. 
 








A.  All NFL Football Games, 1995-2006 
    
Day of Week and Season/Postseason    
   Regular Season Games  993  .95 
      Sunday Games  866  .87 
      Monday Night Football  68  .07 
      Thursday, Friday, or Saturday Games  59  .06 
   Postseason Games (36 on Sunday, 17 on Saturday)  53  .05 
    
B.  Sunday Regular Season NFL Games, 1995-2006 
    
Outcome    
   Loss  414  .48 
   Win  452  .52 
 
Predicted and Actual Outcomes Based on Pre-Game Point Spread
  
    
   Predicted Win: Point Spread ≤ 4  283  .33 
      Actual Loss  (Upset Loss) 79  .28 
   Predicted Close: -4 < Point Spread < 4  377  .44 
      Actual Loss (Close Loss) 194  .49 
   Predicted Loss: Point Spread ≥ 4  206  .24 
      Actual Win (Upset Win) 65  .32 
 
Predicted and Actual Outcomes Based on Halftime Point Spread 
  
    
   Predicted Win: Halftime Point Spread ≤ 4  338  .39 
      Actual Loss  (Halftime Upset Loss) 61  .18 
   Predicted Close: -4 < Halftime Point Spread < 4  240  .28 
      Actual Loss (Halftime Close Loss) 126  .53 
   Predicted Loss: Halftime Point Spread ≥ 4  288  .33 
      Actual Win (Halftime Upset Win) 61 
  .21 
   
No Sunday Game    
   Played on Another Day of the Week  127  .67 
   “Bye” Week  62  .33 
    
By Time of Day    
   1 PM ET Start Time  587  .68 
   4 PM ET Start Time  224  .26 
   8 PM ET Start Time  55  .06 
    
Salient Games    
   (a) Still in Playoff Contention  589  .68 
   (b) Against a Traditional Rival  201  .23 
   (c) Sacks≥4, Turnovers≥4, or Penalties>80 yds  341  .39 
   (d) Highly Salient: (a) and [(b) or (c)]  321  .37 
    
C.  Nielsen Media Research Local Television Ratings, 1997-2006 
    
Percent of Local TV Households Watching Game  Average (%)  Max (%) 
Local Team Playing  24.3  47.9 
   1 PM Game     
      Local Team Playing  23.1  47.2 
      Local Team not Playing that Sunday  8.1  17.7 
   4 PM Game     
      Local Team Playing  29.4  47.9 
      Local Team not Playing that Sunday  12.3  22.2 
   8 PM Game (ESPN/TNT games only)     
      Local Team Playing  10.1  19.0 
      Local Team not Playing that Sunday  8.3  21.4 
    
Notes:  Sample covers the teams and years listed in Table 2.  Starting times of games are approximate.  See notes to 
Table 6 for definitions of salient games.  Nielsen ratings begin in 1997 for Carolina, Denver, Detroit, and New 
England; 1998 for Tennessee; and 2000 for Kansas.  Ratings for the 8 PM games do not include the 2006 season, as 
the broadcasts switched from cable/satellite (ESPN/TNT) to an over the air network (NBC) in 2006.  Average 
ratings for 8 PM games in 2006 are 33.9% and 9.1% when the local team is playing and not playing, respectively. Table 4.  Unexpected Emotional Shocks from Football Games and Male-on-Female Intimate Partner 
Violence Occurring at Home. 
 
       
  Poisson Regression 
Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 
     Baseline 
Model 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
(a) Loss × Predicted Win  (Upset Loss)  .112 .099 .100 .096 .100 
  (.034) (.032) (.032) (.031) (.031) 
Loss × Predicted Close  (Close Loss)  .031 .030 .032 .025 .026 
  (.026) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) 
(b) Win × Predicted Loss  (Upset Win)  .001 .007 .016 .010 .007 
  (.037) (.027) (.027) (.029) (.029) 
Predicted  Win  -.014 -.019 -.018 -.009 -.081 
  (.028) (.025) (.025) (.024) (.035) 
Predicted  Close  -.022 -.012 -.013 -.010 -.080 
  (.025) (.030) (.028) (.030) (.043) 
Predicted  Loss  -.016 -.007 -.016 .006 -.071 
  (.023) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.039) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- --- --- 
Nielsen  Rating       .003 
       (.001) 
       
Agency  Fixed  Effects  X X X X X 
Season, Week of Season, & Holiday Variables  X  X  X  X 
Weather  Variables      X X X 
Nielsen  Data  Sub-sample      X  X 
       
Loss Aversion Test: 
     p-value for row (a) = –  row  (b)  .02 .01 .00 .01 .01 
       
Number  of  Agencies  764 764 764 747 747 
Observations 79,386  79,386 79,386 73,522 73,522 
   
    
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by team×season (62 groups).  Predicted win indicates a point 
spread of -4 or less (negative spreads indicate the number of points a team is expected to win by); predicted close 
indicates a point spread between -4 and +4 exclusive; predicted loss indicates a spread of +4 or more.  Sample is 
limited to Sundays during the regular NFL football season.  Agencies are NIBRS law enforcement units reporting 
crime for a city or county; agencies are matched to the corresponding local NFL team for their state.  The unit of 
observation is an agency–day (where a day runs from 12:00 PM to 11:59 PM ET).  There are 12 football seasons 
included in the sample and 17 weeks in each season.  The holiday variables include indicators for Christmas Eve, 
Christmas Day, New Year’s Eve, New Year’s Day, Halloween, as well as Thanksgiving, Labor, Columbus, and 
Veterans Day weekends.  Weather variables include indicators for hot, high heat index, cold, windy, rainy, and 
snowy days.  The Nielsen data subsample is limited to observations with available television ratings; for earlier 
seasons, not all local markets were tracked by Nielsen Media Research (see note to Table 3). Table 5.  Timing of Shocks and Violence. 
 
        
  Poisson Regression 
Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 
 
 
Assaults Occurring between (Eastern Time): 
      
  12 PM to 3 PM  3 PM to 6 PM  6 PM to 9 PM  9 PM to 12 AM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Games starting at 1 PM        
Loss × Predicted Win  (Upset Loss)  .075 .200 .036 .075 
  (.075) (.057) (.071) (.073) 
Loss × Predicted Close  (Close Loss) .012  -.002  -.013  .077 
  (.058) (.065) (.056) (.050) 
Win × Predicted Loss  (Upset Win) .017  -.071 -.006  .036 
  (.073) (.067) (.057) (.050) 
Predicted Win  -.007  -.140  .070  -.191 
 (.105)  (.103)  (.090)  (.095) 
Predicted  Close  .024 -.075 .049 -.154 
 (.097)  (.097)  (.083)  (.097) 
Predicted Loss  -.075  -.039  .029  -.117 
  (.087) (.099) (.079) (.085) 
Nielsen Rating  .001  .005  -.002  .006 
 (.004)  (.004)  (.003)  (.003) 
        
Games starting at 4 PM        
Loss × Predicted Win  (Upset Loss)  .033 .235 .307 .137 
  (.182) (.216) (.167) (.170) 
Loss × Predicted Close  (Close Loss) .064  .211  .016  -.042 
  (.113) (.110) (.091) (.103) 
Win × Predicted Loss  (Upset Win) .115  .121  -.282  .024 
  (.203) (.157) (.124) (.121) 
Predicted  Win  -.188 .035 -.100 -.040 
 (.240)  (.177)  (.160)  (.160) 
Predicted Close  -.263  -.117  -.124  -.083 
 (.213)  (.154)  (.129)  (.126) 
Predicted Loss  -.073  -.022  -.096  -.101 
  (.206) (.133) (.123) (.128) 
Nielsen  Rating  .006 -.002 .006 .004 
 (.007)  (.006)  (.005)  (.005) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- --- 
        
Number  of  Agencies  563 591 619 620 
Observations  63,875 65,285 67,426 67,308 
      
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by team×season.  Regressions include agency fixed effects, season 
dummies, week of season dummies, and the holiday and weather variables described in the note to Table 4.   
Estimated models are comparable to the baseline model in column 3 of Table 4.  See notes to Table 4 for details.  
Each column is a single regression for a given three-hour period and allows for separate coefficients for games 
starting at 1 PM versus 4 PM.   Table 6.  Shocks from Emotionally Salient Games. 
 
      
  Poisson Regression 
Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 
      
  
Game Type = 
Still in Playoff 
Contention 
 
Game Type = 
Traditional 
Rivals 





Game Type = 
Highly Salient: 
(1) & [(2) or 
(3)] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
More Salient Games (Game Type = 1)        
(a) Loss × Predicted Win  (Upset Loss)  .126 .197 .151 .172 
  (.034) (.046) (.048) (.045) 
Loss × Predicted Close  (Close Loss)  .054 .011 .027 .082 
  (.031) (.053) (.038) (.046) 
Win × Predicted Loss  (Upset Win)  .027 .156 .083 .063 
  (.048) (.080) (.040) (.059) 
Predicted  Win  -.021 -.042 -.055 -.042 
  (.028) (.036) (.035) (.029) 
Predicted  Close  -.040 -.021 .019 -.068 
  (.034) (.051) (.038) (.044) 
Predicted Loss  -.023  -.042  -.024  .010 
  (.033) (.055) (.026) (.038) 
        
Less Salient Games (Game Type = 0)        
(b) Loss × Predicted Win  (Upset Loss) -.016  .080  .070  .028 
  (.080) (.034) (.037) (.041) 
Loss × Predicted Close  (Close Loss) -.003  .035  .042  .018 
  (.030) (.026) (.034) (.028) 
Win × Predicted Loss  (Upset Win) .002 -.011 -.024 -.004 
  (.039) (.030) (.033) (.027) 
Predicted  Win  -.013 -.014 -.009 -.010 
  (.055) (.027) (.028) (.030) 
Predicted Close  .032  -.012  -.012  .004 
  (.032) (.029) (.032) (.029) 
Predicted  Loss  -.008 -.012 .006 -.023 
  (.028) (.020) (.027) (.021) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- --- 
      
Salience Test: 
     p-value for row (a) = row (b)  .11 .01 .17 .01 
      
Number  of  Agencies  764 764 764 764 
Observations  79,386 79,386 79,386 79,386 
      
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by team×season.  Regressions include agency fixed effects, season 
dummies, week of season dummies, and the holiday and weather variables described in the note to Table 4.   
Estimated models are comparable to the baseline model in column 3 of Table 4.  See notes to Table 4 for details.  
Each column is a single regression which allows for separate coefficients by game type.  Still in playoff contention 
indicates that a team has a greater than 10% chance of making the playoffs given their current win-loss record, based 
on the probability that any NFL team made the playoffs with such a win-loss record between 1995 and 2006.  
Traditional rivals indicates a game between traditional rivals, as defined by “Rivalries in the National Football 
League” on Wikipedia. Table 7.  Updating Based on the Halftime Score Differential. 
 
      
  Poisson Regression 
Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home
     
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Loss × Predicted Win  (Upset Loss)  .116 .105 .142 
  (.033) (.028) (.033) 
Loss × Predicted Close  (Close Loss)  .046 .035 .059 
  (.024) (.020) (.026) 
Win × Predicted Loss  (Upset Win) .006  .007  -.015 
  (.029) (.025) (.030) 
Loss × Halftime Predicted Win  (Halftime Upset Loss)  -.010  -.030 
 (.031)    (.035) 
Loss × Halftime Predicted Close  (Halftime Close Loss)  -.036  -.047 
 (.021)    (.026) 
Win × Halftime Predicted Loss  (Halftime Upset Win) .004    .023 
 (.037)    (.042) 
Predicted Win  -.018     
 (.026)     
Predicted Close  -.014     
 (.028)     
Predicted Loss  -.006     
 (.022)     
Spread   .001  .003 
   (.002)  (.002) 
Halftime Spread      -.001 
     (.001) 
Non-game Day    .016  .015 
   (.019)  (.020) 
     
Joint Significance of Halftime Variables 
     p-value  .36  .50 
     
Number  of  Agencies  764 764 764 
Observations  79,386 79,386 79,386 
     
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by team×season.  Regressions include agency fixed effects, season 
dummies, week of season dummies, and the holiday and weather variables described in the note to Table 4.   
Estimated models are comparable to the baseline model in column 3 of Table 4.  See notes to Table 4 for details.  
Predicted win, predicted close, and predicted loss are based on the pre-game point spread (negative spreads indicate 
the number of points a team is expected to win by).  Predicted win indicates a point spread of -4 or less; predicted 
close indicates a point spread between -4 and +4 exclusive; predicted loss indicates a spread of +4 or more.   
Halftime predicted win, halftime predicted close, and halftime predicted loss are based on the halftime “point 
spread” (where a negative halftime spread indicates the number of points a team is winning by at halftime).   
Predicted halftime win indicates a halftime spread of -4 or less; predicted halftime close indicates a halftime spread 
between -4 and +4 exclusive; predicted halftime loss indicates a halftime spread of +4 or more.  For an analysis of 
the relative predictive power of these measures, see the online Appendix Table 1. 
 Figure 1: Risk of Violence Following Loss or Win
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Notes: Realized score differential is opponent’s minus local team’s final score.  The plotted
regression line has an intercept of −.17 (s.e.=.21) and a slope of 1.01 (s.e.=.03).
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Note: Curve is fit from a regression of the probability of victory for the local team on a third order
polynomial in the spread.
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Note: Each rating point equals 1% of the total number of television households in the local market.
The plotted regression line controls for team fixed effects and has an intercept of 24.89 (s.e.=.20)
and a slope of −.12 (s.e.=.03).
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Notes: Dashed lines are pointwise 95% confidence intervals.  Highly salient games include
games in which the local team is still in playoff contention and also is playing against a traditional
rival or has an unusually large number of sacks, turnovers, or penalties (see Table 6).
 
Figure 5: Differential Increase in Violence for a Loss versus a Win, as a
Function of the Spread, For Highly Salient GamesAppendix Table 1.  Predictive Power of the Pre-Game Point Spread versus the Halftime Point Spread. 
 
        
  Probit Regression 
Dependent Variable = Win 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Spread -.081    -.057       
  (.004)  (.004)      
  [-.033]  [-.023]      
Halftime Spread    -.092  -.086       
   (.003)  (.003)      
   [-.037]  [-.034]       
Predicted  Win       .580  .448 
       (.052)  (.057) 
       [.226]  [.176] 
Predicted Loss        -.667    -.485 
       (.052)  (.057) 
       [-.259]  [-.191] 
Halftime  Predicted  Win       .840  .790 
       (.056)  (.058) 
       [.323]  [.306] 
Halftime Predicted Loss          -.953  -.864 
       (.056)  (.058) 
       [-.364]  [-.332] 
        
Pseudo  R-squared  .11 .28 .32 .09 .23 .27 
Observations  3,725 3,725 3,725 3,725 3,725 3,725 
        
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; marginal effects in brackets.  Sample is all regular season NFL football 
games played during the 1995 to 2006 seasons.  Predicted win and predicted loss are based on the pre-game point 
spread (negative spreads indicate the number of points a team is expected to win by).  Predicted win indicates a 
point spread of -4 or less; predicted loss indicates a spread of +4 or more.  Halftime predicted win and halftime 
predicted loss are based on the halftime “point spread” (where a negative halftime spread indicates the number of 
points a team is winning by at halftime).  Predicted halftime win indicates a halftime spread of -4 or less; predicted 
halftime loss indicates a halftime spread of +4 or more. 
 Appendix Table 2.  Location and Victim-Offender Relationship. 
 
           
  Poisson Regression 
           





























  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
Loss  ×  Predicted  Win .100  -.106 .067 .020 .091 .103 .010 .079 
   (Upset Loss)  (.032)  (.092) (.028) (.063) (.040) (.050) (.038) (.038) 
Loss × Predicted Close  .032  -.056  .019  -.025  .032  .030  -.004  .029 
   (Close Loss)  (.024)  (.049) (.023) (.050) (.028) (.036) (.030) (.027) 
Win × Predicted Loss  .016  -.014  .011  -.167  -.009  .046  .016  -.033 
   (Upset Win)  (.027)  (.085) (.028) (.069) (.039) (.051) (.034) (.046) 
Predicted  Win  -.018 .046 -.007 -.001 -.009 -.024 .014 -.010 
  (.025)  (.061) (.022) (.064) (.031) (.039) (.031) (.029) 
Predicted  Close  -.013  -.006 -.012 -.000 -.008 -.020 .053 -.020 
  (.028)  (.058) (.025) (.055) (.035) (.039) (.036) (.028) 
Predicted  Loss  -.016  .038 .007 .014 -.006 -.033 .043 .015 
  (.021)  (.052) (.020) (.052) (.030) (.034) (.024) (.023) 
Non-game  Day  ---  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
           
Number  of  Agencies 764  572 764 603 713 668 698 680 
Observations 79,386  69,539  79,386  71,609 77,361 75,385 77,017 76,261 
           
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by team×season.  Regressions include agency fixed effects, season 
dummies, week of season dummies, and the holiday and weather variables described in the note to Table 4.   
Estimated models are comparable to the baseline model in column 3 of Table 4.  See notes to Table 4 for details.  At 
home indicates the incident occurred at a residence/home; away indicates all other locations.  Wife is defined as the 
victim being a current wife, a common-law wife, or an ex-wife.  Non-IP family violence is defined as violence 
committed against any family member except an intimate partner (for example, a child, sibling, parent, or in-law).  
Non-IP friend violence is violence against a friend, acquaintance, neighbor, or otherwise known victim who is not a 
family member or intimate partner. 
 
 Appendix Table 3.  Additional Results. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
Loss  ×  Predicted  Win  .140 .124 .077 .128 .081 .090 .112 
   (Upset Loss)  (.068) (.037) (.047) (.051) (.037) (.043) (.039) 
Loss × Predicted Close  .047  -.035  .095  .039  .027  .035  .029 
   (Close Loss)  (.066) (.034) (.029) (.027) (.031) (.039) (.030) 
Win × Predicted Loss  .033  -.061  .080  -.008  .031  .078  -.026 
   (Upset Win)  (.061) (.037) (.039) (.054) (.032) (.041) (.034) 
Predicted  Win  -.006 -.013 -.023 .010 -.035 -.001 -.032 
  (.053) (.033) (.036) (.034) (.033) (.037) (.030) 
Predicted  Close  .001 .036 -.060  -.014 .011 .017 -.024 
  (.058) (.036) (.041) (.037) (.034) (.040) (.031) 
Predicted  Loss  -.030 -.023 -.007 .013 -.032 -.012 -.013 
  (.048) (.033) (.034) (.038) (.028) (.034) (.024) 
Non-game  Day  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Number  of  Agencies  545 673 702 650 134 651 724 
Observations  64,286 74,576 76,580 62,526 16,842 74,178 77,957 
         
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by team×season.  Regressions include agency fixed effects, season 
dummies, week of season dummies, and the holiday and weather variables described in the note to Table 4.   
Estimated models are comparable to the baseline model in column 3 of Table 4.  See notes to Table 4 for details.  
Alcohol involved indicates the reporting officer noted that either alcohol or drugs were a contributing factor.  Minor 
assault is simple assault or intimidation without injury; serious assault is aggravated assault or any assault with a 
physical injury.  
 Appendix Table 4.  Robustness Checks. 
 
        
  Intimate Partner Violence, Male on Female, at Home 











  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
Loss  ×  Predicted  Win  .109  .096 .091 .099 .084 
   (Upset Loss)  (.032)  (.032) (.035) (.034) (.029) 
Loss × Predicted Close  .034  .038  .025  .029  .031 
   (Close Loss)  (.025)  (.027) (.030) (.028) (.023) 
Win × Predicted Loss  .014  .022  .022  -.000  .010 
   (Upset Win)  (.028)  (.029) (.029) (.031) (.029) 
Predicted  Win  -.020  -.018 -.025 -.030 -.006 
  (.025)  (.025) (.030) (.025) (.025) 
Predicted  Close  -.017  -.023 -.009 -.022 -.012 
  (.029)  (.030) (.031) (.027) (.028) 
Predicted  Loss  -.016  -.019 -.019 -.022 -.020 
  (.021)  (.021) (.022) (.024) (.023) 
Non-game  Day  ---  --- --- --- --- 
        
Number  of  Agencies  764  764 447 764 764 
Observations 79,386  90,450 41,111 79,386 79,386 
        
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by team×season.  Regressions include agency fixed effects, season 
dummies, week of season dummies, and the holiday and weather variables described in the note to Table 4.   
Estimated models are comparable to the baseline model in column 3 of Table 4.  See notes to Table 4 for details.  
All columns except for column 1 use Poisson regression.  In the baseline model appearing in Table 4, if there is a 
24-hour day with no crime of any type (not just IPV) reported to NIBRS within our sample, that day is dropped and 
treated as missing at random.  Column 2 alternatively treats these missing days as days with zero IPV.  Column 3 
only includes an agency in a given season if the agency reports incident data for all 17 Sundays of the regular 
football season.  Column 4 includes dummies for the different Sundays included in our sample (204 Sundays).  
Column 5 includes team-specific linear season trends. 
 Appendix Table 5.  Stata Output for Baseline Model. 
 
 
. poisson ipmfhometot $basevars ww* yy* $smallhh $weather oo* if insamp, difficult 
iterate(25) cluster(teamseason) 
note: ww17 omitted because of collinearity 
note: yy12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: oo764 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood =  -832585.7  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -500980.89   
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -388779.09  (backed up) 
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood =  -312996.3  (backed up) 
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -232056.89  (backed up) 
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -203536.46  (backed up) 
Iteration 6:   log pseudolikelihood = -175822.63  (backed up) 
Iteration 7:   log pseudolikelihood = -149445.89   
Iteration 8:   log pseudolikelihood = -55009.811   
Iteration 9:   log pseudolikelihood = -45116.918   
Iteration 10:  log pseudolikelihood = -44436.296   
Iteration 11:  log pseudolikelihood = -44395.334   
Iteration 12:  log pseudolikelihood = -44394.427   
Iteration 13:  log pseudolikelihood = -44394.412   
Iteration 14:  log pseudolikelihood = -44394.412   
 
Poisson regression                                Number of obs   =      79386 
                                                  Wald chi2(64)   =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -44394.412                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 62 clusters in teamseason) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 ipmfhometot |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
upsetlossb~e |   .0997021   .0316786     3.15   0.002     .0376131     .161791 
closelossb~e |   .0322801   .0240812     1.34   0.180    -.0149181    .0794783 
upsetwinbase |   .0156303   .0267482     0.58   0.559    -.0367953    .0680559 
 predwinbase |  -.0182454    .024885    -0.73   0.463    -.0670192    .0305283 
predcloseb~e |   -.013471   .0283995    -0.47   0.635    -.0691329     .042191 
predlossbase |   -.015603   .0210993    -0.74   0.460    -.0569569    .0257509 
         ww1 |   .0323798   .0632384     0.51   0.609    -.0915652    .1563248 
         ww2 |  -.0324955   .0567684    -0.57   0.567    -.1437594    .0787685 
         ww3 |   .0424042   .0521468     0.81   0.416    -.0598017    .1446101 
         ww4 |  -.0109752   .0537437    -0.20   0.838     -.116311    .0943606 
         ww5 |  -.0666128   .0572189    -1.16   0.244    -.1787597    .0455342 
         ww6 |  -.1247546   .0483948    -2.58   0.010    -.2196066   -.0299025 
         ww7 |  -.0893211   .0520962    -1.71   0.086    -.1914279    .0127856 
         ww8 |  -.0492017   .0543815    -0.90   0.366    -.1557876    .0573841 
         ww9 |   .0322628    .047417     0.68   0.496    -.0606728    .1251984 
        ww10 |  -.0319723    .042584    -0.75   0.453    -.1154354    .0514909 
        ww11 |  -.0604387   .0397569    -1.52   0.128    -.1383608    .0174835 
        ww12 |  -.0636182   .0407344    -1.56   0.118    -.1434562    .0162198 
        ww13 |   .0064496   .0432304     0.15   0.881    -.0782804    .0911795 
        ww14 |   -.077592   .0409749    -1.89   0.058    -.1579013    .0027174 
        ww15 |   -.032098   .0438526    -0.73   0.464    -.1180476    .0538516 
        ww16 |  -.0518324   .0473532    -1.09   0.274     -.144643    .0409782 
        ww17 |  (omitted) 
         yy1 |   .2797007   .0866698     3.23   0.001     .1098309    .4495704 
         yy2 |   .2083029   .0904594     2.30   0.021     .0310057       .3856 
         yy3 |    .177718   .0449321     3.96   0.000     .0896528    .2657832 
         yy4 |   .1793304   .0518489     3.46   0.001     .0777085    .2809523 
         yy5 |   .1258505   .0615124     2.05   0.041     .0052884    .2464125          yy6 |   .1068725   .0514965     2.08   0.038     .0059411    .2078038 
         yy7 |   .0785671   .0526854     1.49   0.136    -.0246944    .1818286 
         yy8 |   .0061141   .0648259     0.09   0.925    -.1209424    .1331706 
         yy9 |   .0764421   .0428954     1.78   0.075    -.0076314    .1605156 
        yy10 |   .0059727   .0474751     0.13   0.900    -.0870767    .0990222 
        yy11 |   .0604593    .054256     1.11   0.265    -.0458805     .166799 
        yy12 |  (omitted) 
   christeve |  -.0777492   .0558428    -1.39   0.164    -.1871991    .0317007 
   christday |  -.0585899   .0531494    -1.10   0.270    -.1627607    .0455809 
  newyeareve |  -.0791087   .0762438    -1.04   0.299    -.2285438    .0703264 
  newyearday |   .0220847   .0832541     0.27   0.791    -.1410903    .1852596 
   halloween |   .1045813   .0951078     1.10   0.272    -.0818264    .2909891 
   thankswkd |  -.0336233   .0329101    -1.02   0.307    -.0981259    .0308793 
    laborwkd |  -.0686772   .0755504    -0.91   0.363    -.2167532    .0793988 
    columwkd |   .0251814   .0322175     0.78   0.434    -.0379637    .0883265 
      vetwkd |  -.0171233    .049332    -0.35   0.729    -.1138122    .0795656 
         hot |   .0477193   .0288922     1.65   0.099    -.0089084     .104347 
  hiheatindx |  -.0269151   .0750599    -0.36   0.720    -.1740298    .1201995 
        cold |  -.0607541   .0188002    -3.23   0.001    -.0976019   -.0239064 
       windy |  -.1177301   .0742282    -1.59   0.113    -.2632148    .0277546 
     anyrain |   .0075308   .0210958     0.36   0.721    -.0338163    .0488779 
     anysnow |   .0161207   .0307161     0.52   0.600    -.0440818    .0763231 
 
(note: 762 agency indicator variables omitted for brevity) 
 
Notes:  This output matches Table 4, column 3.  While 762 agency indicator variables are included in the regression, 
they are omitted for brevity.  The variables ww1-ww17 are indicators for weeks 1 through 17 of an NFL football 
season.  The variables yy1-yy12 are indicators for each NFL season from 1995 to 2006.  There are self-explanatory 
holiday dummies for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, New Year’s Eve, New Year’s Day, and Halloween as well as 
Thanksgiving, Labor, Columbus, and Veterans Day weekends.  The source for the weather variables is the “Global 
Surface Summary of Day Data” produced by the National Climatic Data Center and available from 
ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/gsod.  Weather information is collected for the capital of each state in our sample 
and assigned to all cities or counties within that state.  The dummy variable hot indicates a maximum daily 
temperature greater than 80 degrees Fahrenheit; the dummy variable cold indicates a minimum daily temperature 
less than or equal to 32 degrees.  The variable hiheatindx is a dummy for the heat index (a measure incorporating 
both humidity and temperature) being over 100.  The variable windy is a dummy for a maximum daily wind speed of 
greater than 17 knots.  The variables anyrain and anysnow are indicators for any rainfall and any snowfall. 
 
 